This paper presents a novel approach for checking route oscillation of border gateway protocol (BGP) quickly, by which the privacy of routing policies of autonomous system (AS) can be respected. Firstly, route update chain tag (RUCT) is constructed to track the forwarding of update report, and local routing library is made to record the changing history of update report. Then route oscillation can be identified by analyzing correlative state of RUCT and local routing library. The characteristic of this approach is that an arbitrary AS can check route oscillation alone only by sharing its network ID, which greatly respects the privacy of routing policies for each AS. This paper shows that both looping in RUCT and consecutive positive-negative report in local record are sufficient conditions for route oscillation. Comparative experiments demonstrate the availability and efficiency of the proposed approach.
Introduction1
The border gateway protocol (BGP) [1] is a path vector protocol for exchanging routing information between autonomous systems (ASs), which is currently the only inter-domain routing protocol applied to the Internet. BGP allows each AS to independently formulate and regulate its routing policies for reasons of local rationality, and override the rationality of whole network. It is reported that BGP is usually weak in operational and security issue as shown in Ref. [2] . Current research on BGP focuses on exposing and resolving both operational and security concerns. Operational concerns [3] [4] [5] deal with convergence delay, routing stability and performance of BGP, while security (60921001) 1000-9361 © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. doi: 10.1016/S1000-9361(11)60024-1 research [6] [7] [8] relates to the integrity, confidentiality and authentication of BGP messages. These two fields of operational issues and security research are inherently connected. Route oscillation, an important factor to impact routing stability, has been the focus of many efforts. BGP route oscillation can significantly degrade the end-to-end network performance and depress the overall efficiency of network.
Broadly speaking, this problem can be addressed either statically or dynamically. A static solution would rely on programs to pre-analyze routing policies and verify that they do not contain policy conflict which will lead to route oscillation. For example, Routing Arbiter project is designed in Ref. [9] to check route oscillation. This project consists of three elements: 1) a common description language for routing policy specification; 2) a distributed registry system that allows providers to publish their policies in this language; and 3) a suite of tools for analyzing the impact of provider routing policies on Internet traffic. However, it is difficult to get detailed routing policies and path information, and research of Ref. [10] indicates that checking for various global convergence conditions is either NP-complete or NP-hard. Considering this problem, Refs. [11] - [12] improve the acquiring mechanism of routing policies and present subnet-relationship-based approaches for detecting policy conflict. The dynamic solution is a certain mechanism to suppress or completely prevent BGP route oscillation at run time by extending BGP protocol. For example, route flap damping (RFD) presented in Ref. [13] is a dynamic approach for preventing route oscillation. RFD includes two important parameters, route penalty and threshold, by which route update will be restrained if penalty value exceeds the upper limit of threshold, or be restarted if penalty value falls back to the lower limit of threshold. Ref. [14] shows that RFD can significantly exacerbate the convergence times of relatively stable routes, then makes some improvements on scheme. However, RFD cannot really eliminate route oscillation which arises from policy conflict. It can only make oscillation run in slow motion [15] . Ref. [16] presents a mechanism to tradeoff policy independence and route stability. This mechanism ensures policy independence as soon as possible and prefers to route stability in need. In addition, it is necessary to obtain enough route information of subnets. Ref. [17] proposes simple path vector protocol (SPVP) and constructs dispute direct graph according to route history which is involved in update report. By SPVP, real-time detection of route oscillation can be conducted, but routing policies of subnets have to be shared and network cost of BGP should be increased.
As shown above, it is the same characteristic for static solution and dynamic solution that each subnet has to share policy information of itself and cooperate to resolve route oscillation problem. In other words, one subnet cannot check route oscillation only by itself alone. Both solutions can ensure the stability of BGP route, but override the privacy of routing policies of subnets. However, BGP is vulnerable in nature [18] . Ref. [19] indicates that clustering network, such as global information grid (GIG), has more reasons to be concerned about BGP security than the commercial Internet. It also denotes that keeping the confidentiality of peering sessions is urgent for BGP security. Therefore, many subnets of GIG or space information network [20] do not widely share their routing policies, or only publish incomplete specifications considering security and privacy. In this case, it is unfeasible for current solutions to check route oscillation in those networks.
Considering the privacy of routing policies, Ref. [21] presents an approach based on dispute direct graph, in which detailed path information is replaced by relative preference. Though this approach respects the privacy of subnets, it is difficult to optimize the threshold for relative preference conflict and it will take a long time to detect route oscillation. Ref. [22] introduces a distributed method to dynamically check BGP route oscillation. According to this approach, each node will create and forward an oscillation flag, called TOKEN, when detecting an oscillation on local path. If the TOKEN comes full circle back to source node, it is affirmed that this route oscillation should occur at source node. Because both local path oscillation and oscillation cycle solely have to be checked, this approach will spend more time in resolving route oscillation too. Moreover, it is necessary to encrypt TOKEN for confidentiality, which is more complex. Ref. [23] proposes a distributed mechanism to eliminate route oscillation. This approach enforces a global preference value on each optional path and prioritizes those paths according to their preference values firstly. The preference value of selected path should be increased by 1 if policy conflict happens. Though this mechanism need not forward any policy information of local node and greatly respects the privacy of routing policies, the ultimate route tree is not optimal, in which many optional paths with higher priority are discarded by error. Ref. [24] offers an approach to check oscillation on source node where routing policies have been modified. But it is not applicable to other nodes except source node, and the path history has to be encrypted too.
This paper presents a novel approach to rapidly check route oscillation on arbitrary subnet. It greatly respects privacy of route policies, and each subnet should only share simple network ID rather than publish detailed path information.
Sufficient Condition of Route Oscillation
Let G=(V, E) be a directed graph to show overall network in which each subnet is acted as a node, where V is the set of all nodes and E the set of all edges' connecting nodes. The direction of edge is decided as follows. For the sake of simplicity, this paper considers only essential characteristic of BGP, and assume that 1) overlapping route and aggregation are ignored, 2) MED and ORGIN attributes are ignored, 3) there is only one connection between ASs, 4) the matter about interior border gateway protocol (IBGP) is ignored, 5) ID of each AS is unique.
Given G=(V, E) in which routing policies are stable at each node initially, u,v V, e uv E. At time t, the optimal path of v is changed for some reasons. According to local policies of u, there are four cases of response output from u after decision-making at time t+1, shown in Table 1 . Table 1 Response output of u after receiving r
In Table 1 , p u is the path with the highest priority among all feasible paths which do not include node v in Adj-RIB-In of u, contrary to (uv)p v . The four cases are presented as follows:
(1) If
, the current optimal path of u is not affected by the change of optimal path at node v. Then u does not advertise any update report to neighbor nodes after receiving v r . (1) If
uv p , the current optimal path of u is not affected by the changing of optimal path at node v. As shown in Fig.2(a) , u does not advertise any update report at time t and t+1. It is not in conflict with this theorem.
(2) If The theorem has been proved. Proof According to the number of transmission edges of every node, there are two cases as follows:
(1) If maximum number of transmission edge is 2 as shown in Fig.4(a) , which means each node has transmission edges with two neighbor nodes at most, this lemma is true according to Theorem 1.
(2) If the number of transmission edges is more than 2 at some nodes, for example z and y as shown in Fig.4(b) , we assume that path information carried by r z Fig.4 It is clear that r v will appear repeatedly at node v, which means route oscillation happens.
The theorem has been proved. r will form a loop chain, which means route oscillation will occur at node v.
The lemma has been proved. According to Lemma 2, a sufficient condition of route oscillation is that node detects both loop chain and consecutive positive-negative report in local record, while detailed routing policies and path information of other nodes are not required. are involved in the same route update chain, it is assured that route oscillation will occur at node v.
Design and Implementation

Approach design
Therefore, we present report update chain tag (RUCT) to judge whether r v and are involved in the same route update chain. RUCT is a network ID set of nodes which are traversed by forwarding update report. When network ID of one node has been included by RUCT, it is affirmable that this node should have been involved in this route update chain. So this chain should loop if this node advertises update report again. In addition, we make local library to record changing history of route update report, by which the consecutive positive-negative reports can be detected. For an arbitrary node, such as v, we make rules as follows:
(1) When receiving route update report r x , v will advertise update report r v and insert r v into local library if the current optimal path is changed after route decision-making. If RUCT is not accompanied by r x , v has to create RUCT and add local network ID to RUCT. Then v will advertise r v together with RUCT to other neighbor nodes.
(2) After receiving r v together with RUCT, neighbor node firstly makes decision to check whether the optimal path will be changed. If there is no change, it is unnecessary to transfer forwards RUCT, which means that RUCT should end here. Otherwise, this node should add its network ID to RUCT and revise local record. Then this node should transfer forwards RUCT together with the new update report.
(3) If receiving update report again, v should judge whether the optimal path will be changed or not. If it is not changed, v stops forwarding RUCT similarly. Oth- According to the above rules, each node should only add local network ID to RUCT rather than share detailed routing policies or path information. Whether route oscillation would occur at each node can be judged by checking RUCT and local history record, which improves the security and secrecy of information.
Extending BGP
RUCT consists of network IDs, and we can extend BGP to construct and transfer forwards RUCT. The additional routing parameter of BGP can be assigned to a special path attribute of route update report. A path attribute consists of one byte of flag, one byte of code, one or two bytes of length and multiple bytes of data. Then we extend an optional non-transitive path attribute to express RUCT, named PRUCT.
As shown in Fig.6 , attribute code of PRUCT is 31 (1F in hexadecimal), attribute length of PRUCT is two bytes (which is enough to be fit for most applications), and attribute data of PRUCT is loaded by a series of network IDs. 
Pseudo code
We design the pseudo code for each node to implement approach based on RUCT, shown in Fig.7 . For an arbitrary node u, maybe the optimal path changes when update report is received or local routing policies are modified. Firstly, we get the new route update report r new and detect whether RUCT has been carried or not. If not, it means that the changing of optimal path is due to modification of local routing policies or network topology. Then RUCT should be created and transferred forwards together with r new . If RUCT is carried, we will go on to check whether RUCT includes local network ID or not. If RUCT does not include local ID, it is necessary to add local ID to RUCT and transfer forwards RUCT together with r new . And the history record r h should be updated with r new . If RUCT includes local ID, it means that the update report chain loops. Then we will go on to check whether r h is equal to new r or not. If r h = new r , it is assured that route oscillation should happen according to Lemma 2. Otherwise, r h should be updated with r new , and RUCT should be transferred forwards without being modified.
Simulation Experiment
We demonstrate this approach on traditional model. As shown in Fig.8 , this model consists of four nodes. Each node represents a subnet, and Node 0 means destination. The numeral arrays beside nodes are all feasible paths, which array by priority from the top down. We simulate this model by C language, and the result is shown in Fig.9 .
Initially the whole network has a stable routing tree ((10), (20) , (310)), which is tagged by arrow as shown in Fig.8 . Sometimes, the routing policies of Node 1 are modified, where the priority of path (120) is adjusted to be higher than priority of path (10) . Then route oscillation will happen. At time 0, the whole network has a stable routing tree.
At time 1, the policies of Node 1 are modified, where the optimal path is changed from (10) to (120). Node 1 will create update report r 1 =( (120), (10) ) and RUCT={1}, and will transfer them forwards to other nodes. In addition, the history record of Node 1 will be updated with 1 h r =( (120), (10)). At time 2, Node 2 does not respond after receiving update report. On the other hand, Node 3 will change optimal path after decision-making. It is obviously that RUCT={1} does not include network ID of Node 3 and the history record of Node 3 is empty. Node 3 should change RUCT={1} to RUCT={1,3} and create update report r r . In addition, network ID of Node 1 has been included in the received RUCT= {1,3,2}, which means the update report chain loops. Therefore we can assure that route oscillation will occur at Node 1.
We compare this approach based on RUCT (signed by RUCT) with approach based on relative preference [21] (signed by RP) and approach based on TO-KEN [22] (signed by TOKEN). Both RP and TOKEN respect privacy of routing policies and have optimal ultimate route tree after eliminating oscillation, which means they are typically similar researches with RUCT. Figs.10-11 show the comparison of on checking time and cost between three approaches. The results demonstrate that RUCT is available and efficient. Fig.10 shows the comparison result of checking time whose unit is one MRAI. The checking time of RP is the largest among three approaches, which is more than triple of TOKEN's when MAX_TIMES of RP (upper limit of conflicts) is 4. And the checking time of RUCT is the smallest, which is half of TOKEN's. Fig.11 shows the comparison result of BGP cost. The cost of RP is the least among three approaches, which spends constantly one byte, viz. relative preference. The cost of TOKEN is constant too, which is occupied by attribute flag of node and conflict path after being encrypted. The cost of RUCT is an incremental variable about number of nodes, which is less than cost of TOKEN if the number is small and should exceed cost of TOKEN if the number is too large. However, the total BGP cost of RUCT is very finite because network ID spends merely few bytes. Therefore, RUCT cannot markedly aggravate network cost of BGP.
One thing to be noted is that RUCT requires no additional transmission cost because it is merely a path attribute carried by BGP update report. But the number of nodes included in RUCT is restrained by the maximum message size of BGP update report. As is known to all, the maximum message size of BGP update report is 4 096 bytes, which covers 19-byte BGP head and other necessary properties. So the number of nodes included in RUCT is actually less than 1 000 when network ID of each node occupies 4 bytes.
Conclusions
(1) The RUCT based approach can greatly respect the privacy of routing policies of AS when checking route oscillation.
(2) Compared with other similar approaches, the proposed approach spends the smallest checking time by equivalent network cost of BGP.
(3) This approach only focuses on consecutive positive-negative report in local record. The multi-phase state conversion of local reports will be possibly studied in future.
